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ADDRESSING NET NEUTRALITY THROUGH
THE LENS OF COMPELLED SPEECH
-Kruthika

N.S.*

Abstract-Amongst all the recent debates about the need for
regulation in various sectors, the issue of net neutrality has
presented itself as one of the most important topics with many
stakeholders who are directly interested in the manner in which
this debate is concluded. An important aspect of the net neutrality debate is the question of whether imposing net neutrality on
Internet Service Providers infringes on their right to freedom of
speech and expression. This paper attempts to answer this question. While the freedom of speech argument has predominantly
been used by the Internet Service Providers to argue for greater
flexibility in allowing who should get access to use their platform, the author argues that this argument is based on a very
narrow perception of the right to freedom of speech. The aim of
this paper is twofold. First, to develop a holistic understanding
of the concept of freedom of speech and expression and second,
to show how net neutrality as a concept does not violate this
right.
I. INTRODUCTION
While the jurisprudence on net neutrality is still growing, and it is virtually
non-existent in India, the debate has reached a point where lobbyists and critics
have attempted to make every possible argument for or against it. Of the arguments advanced, the free speech argument is "particularly compelling",' because
there remains a dearth of precedent or even academic discussion pertaining to
the free speech issues arising from net neutrality.2 In fact, the American First
B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) candidate, the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences,
Kolkata.

2

Alexander Owens, Protecting Free Speech In The Digital Age: Does The Fcc's Net Neutrality
Order Violate The FirstAmendment?, 23 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 209 (2013).
See Sara Jerome, Net Neutrality Fight Turns to First Amendment, NATL J. (2009) (describing

proponents and opponents of net neutrality looking to analogous, non-Internet related cases to
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Amendment argument may very well be internet service providers' (hereinafter
"ISPs") best argument to convince the US Supreme Court that net neutrality is
unconstitutional. 3 However, I put forth that the same right- that of free speech
and expression - may be used to make a sound argument for upholding net
neutrality.
Compelled speech is, seemingly, quite antithetical to the discourse on rights
relating to free speech. While a large amount of the scrutiny of Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution of India (hereinafter "Constitution") has been with reference
to the restrictions on speech and expression, and the constitutionality thereof,
the discussion on compelled speech does quite the opposite. This flows from the
premise that while expression ought not to be thwarted by the State, it should not
be compelled either, "... for at the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that
an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's
beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by
the State".'
In this paper, I argue that granting freedom to ISPs to regulate what will be
available on their platforms, and at what speed, will amount to a violation of
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Part II of the paper will discuss the doctrine
of compelled speech, and show that commercial speech gives a large leeway for
the State (assuming throughout this paper that the definition of 'State' is not
under scrutiny) to constitutionally compel speech, which forms the first premise.
The second premise, will show that any act by the State that compels not only
speech, but even the perception of any speech (say, by hearing or reading), will
come under the ambit of Article 19(1)(a) scrutiny. This will bring forth the main
issue, portrayed in Parts III and IV, which is, when exactly can the compulsion of
speech be permitted, and if a proposed move that quashes net neutrality is constitutionally sound. Part III will primarily analyse whether the State may compel
ISPs to portray all data in a neutral manner. The last part, Part IV, will deal with
the compelled speech from the consumers' perspective, and show that allowing
ISPs to regulate data will lead to the lack of choice and hinder information dissemination, thus violating their right to speech in itself.
II. WHAT IS COMPELLED SPEECH
A. Compelled Ideological and Political Speech
The discourse on compelled speech can only be given an apt foundation
by discussing the jurisprudence developed in the United States of America.
Interestingly, the doctrine has developed not as a commercial speech aspect in
the USA, but as an ideological and political one. The roots for the argument

3
4

support their free speech arguments).
Owens, supra note 1.
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 52 L Ed 2d 261 : 431 US 209, 234 (1977).
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against the compulsion of speech are nestled in ideological cases where a religious group refused to allow the State compulsion regarding certain 'speech' that
they were ideologically against. This religious group was primarily, the Jehovah's
Witnesses, which forms a religious denomination that believes, inter alia, that
one must "refrain from all pledges of allegiance to earthly governments"'. Hence,
followers of this denomination refrain from paying their formal respects to any
entity other than that validated by their religious beliefs, and this has first tested
the compelled speech doctrine in the USA. For instance, in a case wherein a
resolution made it mandatory for children of a Jehovah's Witness to pledge allegiance to the confederate flag, the Court struck it down, terming such action to
come within the ambit of compelled speech. 6
Similarly, when a Jehovah's Witness refused to carry a state motto on his
license plate and was penalised by the State, the Court invalidated the penalising
statute, stating that such compulsion of carrying a motto was compelled speech,
which is unconstitutional.7 We gather a snippet of the compelled speech doctrine
from this case:
[T]he right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all . . The right
to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of 'individual freedom
of mind'."
These cases can be compared to an uncannily similar Indian case, which arose
when children of a Jehovah's Witness were made to stand and sing the national
anthem, The Court struck down the mandatory rule as going against the freedom
of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.9 While compelled speech
was not expressly referred to in this case, I find the similarity in issues warrants
its inclusion in this discussion.
Moving from ideological to political speech, a statute warranting a right to
reply of an ostensibly defamed person in the newspaper that published the defamatory material was struck down, as it compelled the editor to proceed against the
paper's right of expression. 0 Apart from these political and ideological perspectives to compelled speech, it is pertinent at this juncture to delve into commercial
speech, where we notice that compulsion of speech is sometimes inevitable.
Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution in Modern
America 16 (2010).
6

,
9
1

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 87 L Ed 1628 : 319 US 624 (1943).
Wooley v. Maynard, 51 L Ed 2d 752 : 430 US 705 (1977) (hereinafter "Wooley").
Wooley, 51 L Ed 2d 752 : 430 US 705 (1977).
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986) 3 SCC 615.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. L. Tornillo, 41 L Ed 2d 730 : 418 US 241, 244 (1974) (hereinafter "Miami Herald Publishing").
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B. Compelled Commercial Speech
The compelled speech doctrine has been extrapolated to commercial speech in
the USA," where two differing strands of compelled commercial speech include:
(a) Cases related to corporations where a state may require warnings on advertisements for products or services; 2 and (b) Compelled-subsidy cases, in which
individuals are not compelled to speak, but rather to subsidise a private message
with which they disagree.1 3
In India, the question of commercial speech has received much analysis, from
the aspect of whether it can even qualify for protection under Article 19(1)(a) of
the Constitution," to the question of when it can be compelled." While I will not
delve into the detailed analysis of why courts have indeed held that commercial
speech falls under the ambit of Article 19(1)(a), 6 it is pertinent to note that commercial speech has been declared to be constitutionally capable of being compelled in certain cases.
The strongest argument for this allowance is the fact that most commercial
speech, such as labelling or advertisements, is used for the dissemination of
information." This flows from the rationale behind protecting commercial speech
as a right itself: commercial transactions in a free enterprise economy to be intelligent and well informed, and better market-regulation as a product of information dissemination. This dissemination of information can include, for instance,
the dietary or health warnings of a product. Hence, a cigarette manufacturer cannot refuse to print a health-warning on each cigarette pack by calling it a compulsion of speech by the State. 9 While this is, indeed, a compulsion, it seeks to
allow the consumer to make an informed choice. This is especially important,
as this is a form of commercial speech, and symmetrical information dissemination is most desirable with regard to such speech. Similarly, if a packaged-food
manufacturer attempts to argue that the State is compelling speech insofar as the
mandatory labelling of nutritional value is concerned, a strong rebuttal would be
information dissemination. This means that the compulsion of speech in this case
would, in fact, aid the protection of commercial free speech, as it ensures that
Stephen Miller, Historic Signs, Commercial Speech, and the Limits of Preservation, 25(2)
JOURNAL OF LAND USE & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 227 (2010).
12
13

14
15

16

19

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 85 L Ed 2d 652 : 471
US 626, 651 (1985).
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Assn., 2005 SCC OnLine US SC 36 544 US 550 (2005) (permitting
the government to anonymously advertise for the beef industry).
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554.
Ozair Husain v. Union of India, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1265 AIR 2003 Del 103 (hereinafter
"Ozair Husain").
Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL, (1995) 5 SCC 139 (hereinafter "Tata Mahanagar Limited").
Tata Mahanagar Limited, (1995) 5 SCC 139.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 48 L Ed 2d 346
425 US 748 (1976).
Ozair Husain, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1265 : AIR 2003 Del 103.
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the consumers are well informed of their choices. So, there have been instances
where speech has been compelled in the name of 'information dissemination'.
Hence it is imperative for the reader to appreciate that not all compelled speech
is disallowed by the courts, and commercial speech especially, has been brought
under this ambit. However, a key factor also to be noted is that in all these cases,
free flow of information plays a pivotal role.
III. COMPELLED SPEECH AS AN AID TO THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
In this part of the paper, I will attempt to tackle the arguments of the ISPs:
that any restriction by the State to uphold net neutrality will be violative of the
ISP's freedom of speech. The most compelling argument of ISPs is on the basis
that they, being the speakers, ought to be given the right to speak or allow anyone they choose to speak on their platform, as though they endorse some opinions over others. Hence, according to them, net neutrality forces them to be
platforms for even those opinions they do not support.
In Buckley v. R. Valeo, 20 the Court had held that "the concept that government
may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment". Hence, according to this reasoning,
the government ought not to restrict the freedom of speech of readers or consumers only to enhance that of the ISPs. A mere citation of Buckley seems sufficient
to demolish the ISPs' argument. However, I shall attempt to take the argument
against the ISPs' even further. This is mainly because this case takes recourse
to others' rights being a reason to curtail the ISP's (ostensible) rights. However,
I shall try and show that while the ISP may have the freedom of speech (without
delving into whether it truly can be a speaker), this freedom is not unassailable.
In India, several cases have laid down the law of the land; that the right to
receive information falls under the ambit of the right to freedom of speech and
expression under Article 19(1)(a). 2 1 These have mostly been cases wherein the
freedom of speech of the press has been restricted, and courts in this regard have
maintained that any unreasonable restriction on the circulation of information,
thus restricting such information from being disseminated, is unconstitutional. 22
However, most of these opinions have been of the dissenting opinion of such
judgments. 23 For instance, in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India,24 Justice
Mathew dissented stating:
2
2

2

23
24

Buckley v. R. Valeo, 46 L Ed 2d 659 : 424 US 1 (1976) (hereinafter "Buckley").
Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294 (hereinafter "Association for
Democratic Reforms"); Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985)
1 SCC 641 (hereinafter "Indian Express").
Indian Express, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
See Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305 : (1962) 3 SCR 842.
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1972) 2 SCC 788 : AIR 1973 SC 106.
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A constitutional prohibition against governmental restriction on
the expression is effective only if the Constitution ensures an
adequate opportunity for discussion . . Any scheme of distribution of newsprint which would make the freedom of speech a
reality by making it possible the dissemination of ideas as news
with as many different facets and colours as possible would not
violate the fundamental right of the freedom of speech of the
petitioners.
While these words of Justice Mathew were only part of the dissenting opinion, with the passage of time, the Court has gradually taken an opposing view
to that expressed in Sakal Papers and Bennett Coleman, and has adopted Justice
Mathew's opinion. For instance, in Union of India v. Motion Picture Assn. 25 , the
Court while upholding various provisions of the Cinematograph Act that compelled 'speech' by filmmakers while showcasing their film (which included showing videos with social messages during intervals) on the basis that earmarking
. . a small portion of time of this entertainment medium for the
purpose of showing scientific, educational or documentary films,
or for showing news films has to be looked at in this context of
promoting dissemination of ideas, information and knowledge to
the masses so that there may be an informed debate and decision making on public issues. Clearly, the impugned provisions
are designed to further free speech and expression and not to
curtail it.
Similarly, Ozair Husain26 has also shown that
compelled in the cases where there ought to be
enable the freedom of choice. In both these cases,
tion through compelling speech was viewed to be
dom of speech as the speech itself.

speech may be argued to be
information dissemination, to
the dissemination of informaas vital an aspect of the free-

However, the above cases did not actually state that all possible opinions ought
to be put forth in the marketplace of ideas. They merely stressed on information
dissemination. Thus arose the question of the reasons behind information dissemination. LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah took that one step further, and emphasised the
need for differing and varied options available for public discourse. 27 Here, the
Court upheld a right of reply in an in-house magazine,
. . because fairness demanded that both view points were
placed before the readers, however limited be their number, to
enable them to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable
2

26
27

Union of India v. Motion Picture Assn., (1999) 6 SCC 150.
Ozair Husain, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1265 : AIR 2003 Del 103.
LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah, (1992) 3 SCC 637.

42

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

28 NLSI REv. (2016)

because there was no logic or proper justification for refusing
publication . . the respondent's fundamental right of speech and
expression clearly entitled him to insist that his views on the
subject should reach those who read the magazine so that they
have a complete picture before them and not a one sided or distorted one.
In fact, this case is a contrast to Miami Herald Publishing,28 where a US
Court had struck down a statute requiring newspapers to print replies from politicians who had been criticised in its editorial pages, finding that such a form
of compelled speech fell far short of passing strict scrutiny, which was applied
due to the law's content-based nature. Hence, as far as India is concerned, information dissemination and the freedom of choice highlight any compelled speech
argument. Thus, even if carrying certain websites that an ISP does not favour
amounts to compelled speech, it is indeed permissible due to the two above factors acting as a justification for such compulsion.
IV. COMPELLED PERCEPTION AND
THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE
In this part of the paper, I will not view the ISPs as the subjects of Article
19(1)(a), but the consumers. By showing that straying from net neutrality will
result in the lack of choice in the marketplace of ideas, I will argue that consumers would be compelled to perceive certain information. Hence, this right to perceive, too, must be safeguarded under Article 19(1)(a).
To establish this, I will delve into the argument that, perception falls within
the ambit of speech. Hence, following this proposition, such perception when
compelled, amounts to compelled speech (which I will term as "compelled perception" for clarity). 29 Finally, I will argue that if such compelled perception
results in the loss of information dissemination, resulting in the lack of freedom
of choice, then it is legally unsound.
The right to perception of any kind, such as hearing or seeing, falls within
the ambit of Article 19(1)(a): In India, several cases have laid down the law of
the land; that the right to receive information falls under the ambit of the right
to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).30 In Association for
Democratic Reforms, where the right to know the details of candidates for election was argued to be instrumental in the vote, which was a form of the right
28
29

Miami Herald Publishing, 41 L Ed 2d 730 : 418 US 241, 244 (1974).
While the idea of compelled perception as applicable to net neutrality and in the context of this
paper is original, I would like to acknowledge that the idea of 'compelled perception' has been
advanced in Peter Ferony, ConstitutionalLaw-From Goblins To Graveyards: The Problem of
Paternalismin Compelled Perception, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 205 (2013).

30

Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 SCC 294; Indian Express, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
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to freedom of speech and expression. Moreover, many scholars have argued that
compelling what one perceived amounted to compelled speech and hence ought
to be within constitutional limits. For instance, a Texas legislation which makes
viewing a sonogram just before abortion, has been argued to be compelled perception. 3 1 In this case, it was argued, and rightly so, that mandating that a pregnant woman must view the sonogram of the foetus before an abortion, amounted
to compelled speech, as such perception fell under the ambit of speech. Hence,
these instances show that it is not merely the 'speaker' per se who may exercise free speech rights, but also the one who perceives. Just as an argument
can be made against compelled 'speech', it can also be made against compelled
perception.
Applying this rationale to the issue of net neutrality, I urge the reader to
envision a future where Airtel is allowed to block access to, say, a consumer
protection website that has published a damning critique of their allegedly lacklustre services. Imagine an internet where Reliance Telecom does not reveal
pages which portray the severe violations of Reliance Trends as far as labour
laws are concerned. Clearly, the problem is far from being just the free speech
concern of the ISPs. Hence, while the ISPs may make a free speech argument on
the lines of any regulation on their material being a dent on their rights, they fail
to see the opposite view. A lack of regulation will inarguably see an imminent
end in the destruction of free speech rights of the receivers, be it the readers, the
listeners, or the consumers. As the argument in this paper has shown that free
speech entails not merely the speaking of, or publishing of any material, a more
nuanced approach is the need of the hour. ISPs cannot claim free speech to be a
one-way street, as the receiving of information is as vital to the free speech discourse as the dissemination of information.

31

Ferony, supra note 29.

